Newly Leaked Minutes: Another high-level meeting of Khartoum regime officials (10 September 2014) stands revealed

 

Eric Reeves, 4 April 2015

 

I received early this morning (Khartoum time) another set of minutes recording yet another meeting of the most senior officials of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime.  The English translation is headed:

 

IN THE NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACIOUS, MOST MERCIFUL


THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT


POPULAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION - INFORMATION SECRETARIAT


**************************************************

Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the President of the Republic held in the residence of the President of the Republic in the Army General Headquarters. Wednesday, 10 September 2014


I will be posting the Arabic original as soon as possible-it is now in my possession in its entirety-but am posting  (because technically easier) the English translation (partial text below; entire text at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Ff ).  The minutes come from the same source in Sudan who provided to me the minutes of the 31 August 2014 meeting of senior regime security and military officials (available in English and Arabic) and also for the 1 July 2014 meeting (again available in English and Arabic). For a compendium of expert opinion on the authenticity of the former (leaked first), see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1w5).

 

I will be commenting further on the highly revealing words and policies articulated in this meeting. What the brutal men of this regime say among themselves-thinking that their words will never leave the room-gives us extraordinary insight into minds of génocidaires.

 

I will focus in good measure on language that seems to be disturbing evidence of diplomatic malfeasance on the part of the African Union's Thabo Mbeke, Haile Menkerios, and Mohamed Ibn Chambas.  Their imbalanced mediation between the belligerents in Sudan's ongoing civil wars, as well as their poisonous relations with South Sudan-particularly over Abyei-are put in a context not previously available from public sources.

Khartoum has obviously been well pleased by the efforts of the three men, as suggested by the comments of various senior officials:

 

"By the way, Haile Menkerios is cooperating with us fully and likewise are Thabo Mbeke and Mohammed Ibn Chambas who are so keen to serve and protect our interest, even more than us."

 

Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein completes his contribution to this theme in the discussion by declaring:

 

"When they visited Qatar they were accorded a good reception and treated generously; they [Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas-ER] are now under our control. These are the ones we use to dismantle the rebellion...  [W]e will also use them [again, MbekiMenkeriosChambas-ER] to subjugate the South to our will and implement the agreement the way we want. All of these envoys promised to submit to the African Union and the United Nations positive reports on Sudan records on human rights and freedoms."

 

Other members of the regime had strong words of praise as well:

 

"Let us bless the agreement politically in the media and keep our real position tightly held among ourselves, working to achieve our goal using the agreement itself. Since Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas are cooperating with us, let us use them to help us achieve the following things..."

 

"After that I met Mbeke and we agreed on the recommendations he should submit in his report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the report to UN Security Council. That should include a request concerning the lifting of sanctions and support to Sudan in addition, he should reflect a good image of the Government of Sudan. For now we have won the game."

 

"But whatever we do to thank Mbeke will not be sufficient to reward him fully for the things he did for our sake and our behalf."

 

"At this stage we must welcome the [Addis Ababa] agreement [September 2014] in order to give Thabo Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas the ability to be seen as productive and having achieved something. Accordingly, we must participate in the writing of the report that will be submitted by Mbeke to the African Union and the UN Security Council in order to ensure that it reflects the political transformation that is taking place in Sudan."

 

This last excerpt is either extraordinary presumption, or reflects confidence that Mbeki will indeed allow members of the genocidal Khartoum regime to "participate in the writing of the report that will be submitted by Mbeke to the African Union and the UN Security Council in order to ensure that it reflects the political transformation that is taking place in Sudan." While there are stirrings within a savagely repressed political opposition, as these and the other sets of minutes make abundantly clear, the National Congress Party regime is doing everything it can to forestall meaningful "transformation."

 

These comments are especially disturbing in light of a statement made by General Ismat Ahmed Babikir, Under-Secretary for Presidential Affairs. It comes in the context of the political charade that is the September 2014 "Addis Agreement," and by way of thanking Mbeke and Ibn Chambas for efforts that the regime clearly feels benefited them enormously:

 

"And I say you must give incentive to Mbeke, his people, and Ibn Chambas from the money of the Islamic Movement that is deposited abroad."

 

After six years of representing the African Union diplomatically as a mediator in Sudan's conflicts (first in Darfur, to no effect), Thabo Mbeke is well known to this regime.  And they are presumably in a position to know whether he would accept "money of the Islamic Movement that is deposited abroad," even though this is hardly a standard method of payment for what are to be neutral and impartial diplomatic efforts.  This is no small matter, since the focus of much these minutes is on Mbeke, the September 2014 agreement in Addis he helped secure, and how that agreement will affect Khartoum's domestic political and electoral plans.

 

I'll conclude these prefatory remarks with the concluding words of the minutes themselves: President al-Bashir speaking of the tasks at hand (again, this meeting occurred on 10 September 2014):

 

"Prevention of any demonstrations in this month of September by means of the arrest of anybody reported to have an intention to participate in demonstrations. Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition."


"Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition"-during the popular uprising in September 2013, Khartoum's security forces were given, as Amnesty International has established, "shoot to kill" orders from the outset. This is what accounted for the hundreds of deaths of unarmed civilians, including innocent bystanders-in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, Atbara, Wad Medani, and other cities. No census was permitted at the morgues of these cities, but it is clear from comments by medical personnel in Khartoum that some 200 people died there alone from bullet wounds. This hardly sounds like "political transformation."

 

The text: I have highlighted this 6,000-word text in several ways:


Text in red italics is what I believe to be most important-there will certainly be disagreements, and I might not agree with my choices tomorrow. But in light of current political realities, and the impending national elections in Sudan, these passages are what I would emphasize. (Notably, there is virtually nothing about Darfur.)

 

Text in bold is for proper names, locations, dates, some institutions, as well as military organizations.  The bold is used continuously throughout the text as a means of reading quickly for a particular topic;

 

Explanatory text provided by the interpreter-unknown to me-is in parentheses ( ) within the body of sentences;

 

Text in blue italics highlights my mainly brief notes of clarification, although there is some editorializing. I have also put asterisk ( *** ) at the beginning of paragraphs I think of greatest significance. This highlighting all presumes the authenticity of the document, which of course can't be established by means of a "chain of custody." My highly reliable and deeply honest Sudanese source communicated to me, indirectly but emphatically, that a number of people put their lives at risk to obtain and leak this document. Given the verdict on authenticity for the previously leaked minutes, I feel quite confident in assuming that these, too, are authentic---and a deep obligation to disseminate them.

 

For those who wish to see the text without color highlighting (only names in bold), see: http://wp.me/s45rOG-6399

 

I have edited the English translation I received to remove typos, proofreading lapses, misspellings, unidiomatic and ungrammatical constructions; in a few places I have sought to clarify what seemed opaque; I have regularized the transliteration of Arabic names and sometimes made them more consistent with common usage; I have not changed the meaning of the text at any point.

 

IN THE NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACIOUS, MOST MERCIFUL


THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT 


POPULAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION - INFORMATION SECRETARIAT


***********************************************

Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the President of the Republic held in the residence of the President of the Republic in the Army General Headquarters. Wednesday, 10 September 2014


The Agenda:

  • Addis Ababa Agreement
  • Security preparations for the elections
  • Implementation of the cooperation agreement with South Sudan

The attendance:


1.     Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir - President of the Republic

2.     al-Zibeer Mohammed al-Hassan - Secretary General of the Islamic  Movement

3.     Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman - Vice President of the Republic

4.     General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein - Minister of Defense

5.     General Khalafal al-Rashid - Deputy Director of the National Intelligence    and Security Services (NISS)

6.     General Osman Tajasir - Director of the Central Security Corporation

7.     General Siddig Amir - Director of Military Intelligence and Security

8.     General Ismat Abdel Rahman - Minister of Interior

9.     Professor Ibrahim Ghandour - Deputy Chairman of the National Congress  Party

10.  General Mustafa Ebeed - Sudan Armed Forces Chief of General Staff

11.  General al-Rashid Fagiri - Director of the Popular Security

12.  General (Police) Ismat Ahmed Babikir - Under-Secretary for Presidential  Affairs


The Deliberations:


President [al-Bashir] opened the meeting by saying welcome to the attendance, then commended the role played by the Secretary General [al-Zibeer Mohammed al-Hassan] in rebuilding the Islamic Movement institutions that came back to life stronger than before, despite the conspiracies and plots of the enemies, and the retreat by many of her own narrow-minded sons. President al-Bashir appreciated the Secretary-General's ability to reconnect the Sudanese Islamic Movement with the rest of the Islamic Movements in order to assume her leading role for all the Islamic Movements world-wideThe Secretary-General presented the Sudanese Islamic Movement as a model for good governance, saying it was copied by many Islamic Movements abroad. Today the Sudanese Islamic Movement is feared by the enemies.


President [al-Bashir] said in this meeting that he wished to hear the opinions on current events of those present. "This is because you represent our ears that we listen with, the eye we see through, and the hand we use to hit every conspirator working to bury the Ingaz Revolution (now known as the National Congress Party) and sue its leaders.

 

Defense Minister General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein:


The Addis Ababa Agreement of September 2014 signed by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) and Sadig al-Mahdi constitutes a deception plan despite the apparent concessions made by the Sudan Revolutionary Forces seen in the light of their original hardline position.

[The "Addis Agreement" of 4 September 2014-between the "National Dialogue" external liaison team of the Khartoum regime and the Sudan Revolutionary Forces-reflected no change of heart on the part of Khartoum, nor does it do more than offer a vague outline for "national dialogue"; the confidence-building measures that are part of the Agreement have had no success. The reasons for this are made abundantly clear in the course of these minutes, where it is repeatedly described as a ploy, a maneuver for the benefit of an international audience (see immediately below Hussein's comments). The full name of the agreement is "The Addis Ababa agreement on the national dialogue and constitutional process in Sudan"-ER]


It is clear that the opposition is aiming to use this agreement in order to dismantle the Ingaz in a benign manner through negotiations after they suffered major defeats in the military operations theatre; but we won't allow that deception to work. As a matter of principle, we don't agree with the idea of a transitional government or the holding of peace-talks outside the country anymore.


Instead we will use these peace-talks to dismantle the rebel militiasBut we will tell them that Addis agreement is accepted, with the aim to give the region and the international community the impression that Sudan is taking the political dialogue initiative seriously. But when it comes to the details we will ask the rebels to disarm and demobilize their forces [in other words, unconditional surrender-ER] in the event they refuse, we will turn public opinion against them. Meanwhile, the Decisive Summer Campaign military operations against them will continue until they surrender.

 

Haile Menkerios came to me in the office, and I discussed with him the issue of how we can demobilize and dismantle the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement-North (SPLA/M-N) and the Darfurian rebel forces. This is to enable them to catch-up with the National Dialogue that will take place from within the country. On the other hand, we must stop South Sudan from supporting these armed movements on the other side.

 

I also discussed with him the necessity of the implementation of the joint cooperation agreement (between the Government of South Sudan [GOSS] and the National Congress Party [NCP]), including issues such as security arrangements, harboring and support to opposition forces, creation of a demilitarized zonezero-line border demarcation, and trade crossing points under the supervision of the African Union. The purpose here is to expose the position of the Government of South Sudan, which refuses to implement agreements made with the world. Moreover, in the event that the army of the GOSS is defeated by Dr. Riek Machar's rebel forces, nobody should blame Khartoum. We will support Dr. Riek's forces in order to take South Sudan by surprise, and make their defeat a lesson to others. We will establish for them a radio broadcasting station.


***  By the way, Haile Menkerios is cooperating with us fully and likewise are Thabo Mbeke and Mohammed Ibn Chambas who are so keen to serve and protect our interest even more than us. When they visited Qatar they were accorded a good reception and treated generously; they are now under our control. These are the ones[Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas-ER] we use to dismantle the rebellionIn case the rebels resist, we will report them to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, and will depict them in the report as the party who rejected a peaceful settlement of the conflict. On the other hand, we will also use them [again, Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas-ER] to subjugate the South to our will and implement the agreement the way we want. All of these envoys promised to submit to the African Union and the United Nations positive reports on Sudan records on human rights and freedoms.


  Full text may be found at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Ff   ...

-- 

 

Eric Reeves 
Smith College
Northampton, MA  01063
       413-585-3326
       ereeves@smith.edu

       Skype: ReevesSudan 

 

       Website:   www.sudanreeves.org

Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007-2012   www.CompromisingWithEvil.org