Fluent, idiomatic, annotated rendering of received English summary translation of minutes from July 1, 2014 meeting in Khartoum | 18 February 2015‏

Herewith a fluent, idiomatic, and annotated rendering of received English summary translation of minutes from July 1, 2014 meeting in Khartoum; those attending included senior military and security officials, as well as President and Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir.
What follows here is a fluent and idiomatic rendering of the summary translation—originating in Sudan—of minutes from a July 1, 2014 meeting of senior regime military and security officials in Khartoum (received 15 February 2015). I have not hesitated to revise sentences in the interest of clarity, but have nowhere changed the meaning of what I received on February 15.
[ The original English text—exactly as received—is transcribed at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Bv . It has many idiomatic, grammatical, spelling, and other errors and in places is not clear without considerable deciphering. In its way, it is a fine translation; but readers are likely to find the revision here a good deal more easily comprehended. I have also highlighted in bold key names and dates, as well as a number of key phrases and clauses.  All interpolated commentary is in italics.
The Arabic text appears in full at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Bq in the form of a series of JPEGs, one for each page of the original document (33 pages). This text has been seen by a number of native Sudanese speakers of Arabic, some of whom have great familiarity with the ways of the Khartoum regime. The view is overwhelmingly that the document is authentic. I have begun assembling a compendium of commentary on the authenticity of the document at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Ca, and will keep it updated as needed. 
Eric Reeves, 18 February 2015
July 1, 2014
Meeting of President Bashir with Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Generals
[page 1]
General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein, Minister of Defense:
---We won't stop the war on DarfurSouth Kordofan and Blue Nile. Our National Dialogue initiative is just a maneuver to provide us with political cover for a continuation of the war against the rebellion. We have instructed the Air Force to bomb any place, whether it is a school, hospital, or a nongovernmental humanitarian organization operating in rebel-controlled areas without permission from the government. Such presence is offensive and should be destroyed.
---The Republic of South Sudan is the greatest threat to our security. But thanks to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), we have been able to maintain relations with armed movements that are fighting in neighboring countries, countries that may constitute a threat to our rule.
---Our aim is to crush the rebellion and liberate South Kordofan; this will result in the end of the war.
---Another security threat is the flow of refugees from the war in South Sudan into Sudan. But even so, we are not going to allow any nongovernmental humanitarian organizations [NGOs] to come to their rescue.
[page 2]
We will treat those fleeing as citizens in order to avoid the experience of the Internally Displaced Persons camps in Darfur, which came to justify an international presence. Moreover, Nuer elements in the refugee population can be of benefit to us in terms of intelligence.
General Mustafa Osman Obeid Salim, Army Chief of Staff:
---We are working to increase the production of all types of heavy and conventional weapons as well as different missiles; we are also working to diversify our production of weapons, with an aim of achieving self-sufficiency.
---We receive assistance from friendly countries like TurkeyRussiaBelarusChina[North?] KoreaIranIndonesia, and Malaysia. This arrangement has been necessitated by the current policies toward us by AmericaIsraelUgandaSouth Sudan, and Europe. And church-based organizations make things even more difficult on this score.
---We are determined to see all Sudan's borders free from rebellion within six months. We are aware of the support extended by South Sudan to the rebellion.
General Siddiq Amer, Director General of Intelligence and Security:
What we must do:
---Continue the Decisive Summer Campaign;
[page 3]
---Campaign with an aim to deny the rebellion any possibility of regrouping or reorganizing its forces;
---Make use of the fact that all the necessary information about the routes to capture Kauda in the Nuba Mountains is available to us;
Of note:
---All our military attachés abroad are following the movements of the rebellion leaders, especially in countries like South SudanUgandaKenya, and Egypt—the locations where they are usually found. The regimes in these host countries are known for their hatred of political Islam.
---Iran trained a hundred of our officers in advanced technological fields and areas such as de-coding, spying, in addition to Military Intelligence; they also supplied us with all necessary equipment for our "information war."
---All the necessary elements for winning the battle against the rebellion are guaranteed; this is largely because we have our agents present in all the armed factions.
Major General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint Staff:
---Our friends have supplied us with the weapons, so we are determined that nobody other than the members of the Islamic movement in the Sudan Armed Forces will rule this country.
---It is a must that we use our intelligence agents to divide and weaken the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) [a coalition of rebel groups—ER].
[page 4]
General Mohamed Graham Omer, SAF Inspector General:
---If we capture Kauda, the SPLA-North will collapse and this by definition means the end of the war.
---We opened four military training camps for the training of Nuba youth in order to use them during the dry season to crush the rebellion.
---We managed to strike a deal with UNAMID [in Darfur], and the Mission has started to coordinate fully with us now: any statement going to the media must be agreed upon first so that we are not blamed in it. [A similar arrangement was first negotiated in 2011 by the UN's Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Georg Charpentier; it is not fully clear what is new about this arrangement with UNAMID].Moreover, the SAF must get a copy of any report to be submitted to the UN: we have specified the channels of collaboration between us on the basis of a well-studied procedure that will not cause harm to the interests of either party.
General Yehia Mohammed Kheir, Minister of State for Defense:
There is an Islamic movement in each and every one of our neighboring countries and our relation with these Islamic movements is strong. As a result, our security situation is better.
[page 5]
---The threat from South Sudan will come to an end once we secure the southern border.
---Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North are, in our eyes, forces belonging to the government of South Sudan. If the rebels are interested in peace, let them put down their guns and after that we will treat them as sons of the areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile—ER].
---The SPLA-N has no qualified cadres that can defeat us in any field. They are good only at fighting; however, armies alone cannot win a war.
The second consideration in our war against the rebels is the nature of the terrain they occupy and operate in. [The Nuba Mountains in particular are very rocky and hilly, and access is quite difficult—ER]
---Two-thirds of Gaddafi's sophisticated armaments are in our hands; he didn't use them because he lacked key technical expertise; but our experts, in collaboration with the Iranian experts, have managed to develop functioning missiles.
[page 6]
General Engineer Imadal-Din Adawy, Chief of Joint Operations:
---In order to protect our land, we have to exploit the regional situation (including political turmoil); nothing prevents us from bringing armed fighters from joining and fighting along with our forces.
---The threat comes from South Sudanese represented in the two Divisions (9th and 10th) [these are the divisional numbers for the forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile during the long civil war, 1983-2005; they were always manned by people native to the two regions, which were essentially left out of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). As a result, the two divisions kept their weapons, organizational structure, and commitment to the people of the regions; but they are not part of the present Sudan People's Liberation Army, either SPLA/Juba or SPLA/In-OppositionKhartoum has consistently refused to accept this fundamental reality about the divisional forces they are fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, even as the regime refers to the "SPLA-North"—ER]. Another threat also comes from the Ugandans. The aim of Ugandans in South Sudan is to supply logistics to the two divisions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile [Khartoum has offered not a shred of evidence to support this claim; it is part of a peculiar self-deception that serves as an excuse for military failures, particularly in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan—ER]. Then the solution is to defeat the two divisions and secure our borders. After that we will release the Lord's Resistance Army to Uganda, but the time for that is not ripe now. [The meaning of "release…to Uganda" is unclear from context; but the statement certainly makes clear that Khartoum is now in control of the LRA, which has previously served as a proxy force in the war against Uganda—ER]
---We must train the Séléka force of Central African Republic (CAR) to support us in our future wars because the color of their skin resembles our, contrary to the color of the Arabs and Islamist groups.
---The National Dialogue will serve to provide us with political cover. We will continue with this effort because it will serve us in our war against the rebellion in the coming dry season.
[page 7]
General Daleel al-Daw Mohamed Fadlalla, Chief of Staff of the Navy: 
---Abu Kashola battle was a big psychological blow to our forces: officers, NCOs, and common soldiers deserted the frontline. Now, however, the morale of our forces is high due to the recent victories we have achieved against the rebellion [in late April 2013, SRF rebels briefly took control of Abu Kershola in South Kordofan, a stinging military defeat for Khartoum—ER].
---We want to attack the rebels at the earliest possible moment because we have managed to secure all the needs of our forces.
General Ismail Breima Abdel-Samad, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
---Our drone planes can go now as far as 1,000 kilometers during spying missions, flying over forests and mountains.
---Kenana airbase is underground and has been designed with highly advanced technologies and proper security measures. This is where we store weapons we receive from our friends. [Kenana Air Base is in White Nile State, south of Khartoum—ER]
[page 8]
General Daleel al-Daw Mohamed Fadlalla, Chief of Staff of the Navy
---No one other than the Sons of the Islamic Movement can rule Sudan. Today the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are an Islamic movementfrom the Chief of Staff of the Army down to the most junior officer. We reject any attempt that might be made to form a transitional government or to hold a constitutional conference.
---We should direct our military and technological resources to spying.
Lt. Gen. (Physician): Ali Sis al-Rhatam [unclear who this is]
---In each and every one of the neighbouring countries that suffer from political instability we have a presence and we have allies there; consequently they don't constitute a threat to us.
---From what I have heard, I am now convinced that we have managed to create a strong leadership for this country, and that we will strengthen our power until the hereafter, whatever the challenges may be.
[page 9]
---The aim of the National Dialogue and the peace talks is to achieve consensus in order to conduct the elections and afterwards share power. But it is also intended to provide political cover for the present Constitution and the Decisive Summer Campaign. Unfortunately, some of our political opponents mistook this for weakness on our part.
---The rebels have no cause. They are an army that belongs to another state [South Sudan], but is staying in our land illegally.
The other armed movements also receive support from South Sudan. This fact is clear to the whole world, including Mbeki [Thabo Mbeki, the African Union's senior diplomat in charge of the various Sudan files; he has proved continuously, disastrously inept; Khartoum officials have expressed confidence elsewhere that they have Mbeki effectively in their pocket—ER]
I've rejected the National Call June 25th agreement because it recognizes SPLM-N as a political party and calls for a political partnership between the SPLM-N and our National Congress Party [the reference to a June 25th agreement here is unclear; a survey of the detailed time-line for 2014 from Small Arms Survey shows nothing of significance on or around this date]. This constitutes a threat to the future life of the Islamic Movement in Sudan. [Despite al-Bashir's "rejection," of the "National Call," the "Sudan Call" has gathered momentum; on 15 December 2014 Sudan Tribune reported that:
The alliance of opposition parties, National Consensus Forces (NCF) endorsed on Thursday the “Sudan Call” and decided to mobilise peaceful demonstrations to bring down the government of president Omer al-Bashir. The political declaration, signed the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 3 December, is the first agreement gathering all the opposition parties, civil society groups and the rebel coalition Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)—ER].
---We refused to give the SPLM-North the state of South Kordofan in the elections of April 2011 because of its position and strategic importance for us in our relationship with South Sudan. [Credible post-election analyses of the April 2011 gubernatorial race between Ahmed Haroun—Khartoum's candidate, and a man indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in Darfur—and the very popular Abdel Aziz al-Hilu make clear that the election was rigged in Haroun's favor. The monitoring of the election by the Carter Center (Atlanta) was disastrously incomplete—ER]
---We have attended the six [African Union] negotiating sessions [attempting to resolve conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile] just to appease the international community, and convince them we are not against peaceful a settlement. But we use the negotiations as a tactic to mislead the countries supporting the negotiations.
[page 10]
The dream of the rebellion is that Islamist rule will wither away; we use this fact to manipulate public opinion.
---The main problem is the SPLM-North because they are experts in interpreting the international imperialists' agenda; whatever we do, they will not respond to peace efforts until they see the Islamists' defeat. They are endeavoring to destroy us.
---The people of Blue Nile don't like Malik Agar [the people of Blue Nile elected Malik Agar as governor] and historical leaders of the Nuba don't like Abdel Aziz al-Hilu either [al-Bashir is apparently referring to men such as Daniel Kodi and Telefon Kuku as the “historical leaders of the Nuba”—ER].
---We do not allow relief assistance to their areas. We have said that if they want an agreement, they must first dissolve the SPLA-North; this action is also connected to their political future in Sudan. We will not allow any party to keep armed forces, this according to Sudanese law.
[page 11]
---Salva Kiir [President of the Republic of South Sudan] has denied providing any support to the rebels, but I insist that he has. And you have the evidence of this. On this score, my advice is that you not ignore any piece of information, whether big or small. This way we can pass it to the countries supporting the rebels, including the United State; this will serve to buy us time to fight the rebels.
---The Garang boys have been distanced. Now we aren't facing any problems in getting information from the South concerning the movement of the rebels.
---We don't negotiate outside the country, and if such negotiations occur, we have used them as a means to take us to the elections in April 2015. Also there is only one army, and if there were relief to the rebel-controlled areas, it would have to be according to our agenda and under our control. There will not be another partnership with rebels again.
Also we have no intention of agreeing to a transitional government or holding a constitutional conference—or to offer any concessions.
[page 12]
We have suppressed the ambitions of the political parties and pushed them to participate in the government according to our agenda. The National Dialogue should lead to an agreement that will eventuate in the elections of April 15, 2015, as well as advancing the Constitution. Regarding the armed movements, they should give up their guns individually on the basis of Doha [referring to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, July 2011—to date, another meaningless agreement on Khartoum's part—ER] and Addis Ababa forums [which have yet to yield any agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM/A-North—ER]. We are going to table this position on disarmament so that we don't loose the support of the African Union (AU)—for the AU offers political possibilities for us. We have assembled a plan to crush the rebellion and control the international borders.
---The armed movements are used by the Republic of South Sudan and other countries to destabilize us. The danger was real when the South was united.
[page 13]
But then the SPLA in Juba split into three groups. So we have to follow the situation closely, because it will have some bearing on the end of the rebellion by the SPLA/North and Sudan Revolutionary Front [a rebel coalition, including the SPLA-North and Darfuri rebel groups] Let us give the Southerners hope so they don't discover what we will do.
---We really benefited from the Gadddafi's armaments, which are in our hands; we can proceed to develop them. Our allies from the Islamic movements are strong. We will contribute to the training of the Libyan army. I've advised them to ensure that all the army and security forces are loyal to the Islamists. You must continue to coordinate with them. Then the Libyan political decision will end up in our hands and under our control in the event the Islamic movements succeed in crushing Haftar (the General Haftar that Bashir wishes to "crush" is operating per the authority of the internationally recognized government of Libya—ER]. We can say that we would secure their oil reserves.
[page 14]
It is clear that the Islamists will win in Libya because of the substantial support from Qatar and Iran, as you know. Today the Libyans have joined forces with us, and we are supporting them with armaments and intelligence. Chad is a strategic ally and we have created joint forces with them. Additionally the Chadian opposition is under our control and we can benefit by keeping them as a reserve force.
---Regarding Central African Republic (CAR). We are the ones who established and created the Séléka movement, and we worked with its chairman; and today they are a force to reckoned with and nobody can overlook them [the Séléka Islamist movement in the Central African Republic (CAR) plunged the country into lawlessness and vast human suffering and destruction following Séléka's seizure of power from (Christian) President Bozizé in March 2013. Much of CAR is now in near total chaos—ER]. When the new government of CAR visited us we told them that they must negotiate (Séléka and anit-balaka), and in this context we signed an agreement with the CAR Government.
[page 15]
South Sudan used to constitute the biggest threat to us because of interventions by: Western countriesAmerica and the Zionists, armed movements, and the international monitoring forces. But now the danger from the south is zero because of the balance of forces that has tilted in our favor. The Western countries will not be able to stay in South Sudan because of the conflict between Salva and the international community.
---The majority of leaders around Salva Kiir are collaborating with us, and former National Congress Party members are the ones ruling the South today. We have no problem now getting all the information from the South we need. We can play the oil card: if we stop the flow of oil, or shut it down, the Ugandans will quit and Salva will be defeated. This dynamic has helped us a lot in getting ample information about the rebellion, which in turn enabled us to achieve many victories against the rebels.
[page 16]
There have been things that we never expected, so we must continue the Decisive Summer Campaign in the coming dry season and prepare for it in a proper manner, one that can lead to the final defeat of all the armed movements.
---Our relation with Ethiopia is more than good. They know the common interest between us, and that we keep many cards in our hands that we may play against them. The cooperation between us is going on, and I consider our relation with them as the best in the region after Chad. We should continue to create with them joint military forces, as well as forge military pacts with them to cover all areas of interest, especially border issues.
[page 17]
---Regarding Eritrea, we have good coordination with them, covering all fields, including the security ones (this jointly with Iran). We are the ones who recommended them to Iran and they have gained a good deal in their relation with Iran, both militarily and economically.
---Regarding Saudi Arabia the relation is generally good; strategically, however, it is not good because of their fear of our relationship with Iran, the Muslim Brothers, and the Salafi-Jihadist movements that are financed by Iran and Qatar. Further, the majority of Arab countries continue to count on the West; and counting on the Western countries is a loss, because we cannot change our relation with Iran and our brothers in exchange for useless relationships.
---Regarding our internal situation, the political parties misunderstood our call for National Dialogue.
[page 18]
We paid a dear price (thousands of martyrs) for the protection of our belief and the country. Our aim is to hand over the flag to coming generations and ensure that Sudan is under the rule of the Islamists. Here is the importance of the armed forces monitoring and supervising political activities. Certainly the SAF can intervene at the right time in case of any threat to the country.
---We will not accept a halting of the war; the solution is military victory. That will be obtained in the Decisive Summer Campaign. You are now instructed to crush the armed movements in all three fronts (Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and Blue Nile). The war against the rebellion must continue.
---For if the war stopped, civilian support for our rule would diminish. The National Congress Party would no longer be able to mobilize the support of the people in support of the war.
[page 19]
We are Islamic resistance revolutionaries, and we refuse the domination of America in the Arab world and African continent. Our religion teaches us and encourages us to fight and terrorize the enemy, as well as preparing forces to confront him: our martyrs to heaven and their dead to hell. There is no way to stop the JihadThe negotiators say they want a comprehensive solution to Sudan's wars; we say only partial or piece-meal solutions.
---We cleaned and purged the SAF of any person who is not an Islamist. Thus there is no other political party that can take power from us through a coup d'état. All the senior officers in the Army are loyal because they are members of the "secret organization" cells of the Islamic movement—and the fate of the Army is tied to the fate of the Islamic Movement.
[page 20]
The outside world doesn't know why we organized the rapid Support Forces (RSF). It is because the Ingaz faced war on many fronts during the 1990s—in Eastern SudanSouth Sudan, and the two areas [al-Bashir and other senior leaders continue to refer to their al-Ingaz (“Salvation”) regime—ER].
This time our war objective is to subdue South Kordofan in the Nuba Mountains. The other fronts we can crush or deal with by means of the Air Force. Let the rebels talk; meanwhile, we are preparing to execute our plan to regain control over our international borders with South Sudan. I am glad from what I have heard that we agree on the following: ---
[1] Preparation for the Decisive Summer Campaign is to continue.
[2] Elections to be held on time April 2015.
[3] Increase the security and military cooperation with Iran.
[4] Mandate the Commander-in-Chief and the President of the Republic to contest for the Presidency; but in the event he [i.e., al-Bashir—ER] is not ready, he must nominate an officer from within SAF.
[page 21]
[5] Maintain the Islamic Identity of the State.
[6] There will be only one Army in Sudan, and to that end we will continue development and modernization of our weapons production, and improve the efficiency of the military production industries.
[7] Formation and organization of Rapid Support Forces in all the states under the supervision of the SAF and National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS).
[8] There will be no holding of any constitutional conference or formation of a transitional government.
[9] Ending the war on the rebellion depends on the surrender and disarming of their forces.


Eric Reeves Smith CollegeNorthampton, MA  01063       413-585-3326       ereeves@smith.edu
       Skype: ReevesSudan 
       Website:   www.sudanreeves.org
Compromising With Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007-2012   www.CompromisingWithEvil.org